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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of detection in distributed networks in the presence of data
falsification (Byzantine) attacks. Detection approaches considered in the paper are based on fully
distributed consensus algorithms, where all of the nodes exchange information only with their neighbors
in the absence of a fusion center. In such networks, we characterize the negative effect of Byzantines
on the steady-state and transient detection performance of the conventional consensus based detection
algorithms. To address this issue, we study the problem from the network designer’s perspective. More
specifically, we first propose a distributed weighted average consensus algorithm that is robust to
Byzantine attacks. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, the global test statistic for detection
can be computed locally at each node using our proposed consensus algorithm. We exploit the statistical
distribution of the nodes’ data to devise techniques for mitigating the influence of data falsifying
Byzantines on the distributed detection system. Since some parameters of the statistical distribution
of the nodes’ data might not be known a priori, we propose learning based techniques to enable an
adaptive design of the local fusion or update rules.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed detection is a well studied topic in the detection theory literature [1]–[3]. The
traditional distributed detection framework comprises of a group of spatially distributed nodes
which acquire the observations regarding the phenomenon of interest and send them to the fusion
center (FC) where a global decision is made. However, in many scenarios a centralized FC may
not be available or in large networks, the FC can become an information bottleneck that may
cause degradation of system performance, and may even lead to system failure. Also, due to
the distributed nature of future communication networks, and various practical constraints, e.g.,
absence of the FC, transmit power or hardware constraints and dynamic characteristic of wireless
medium, it may be desirable to employ alternate peer-to-peer local information exchange in order
to reach a global decision. One such distributed approach for peer-to-peer local information
exchange and inference is the use of a consensus algorithm [27].
Recently, distributed detection based on consensus algorithms has been explored in [4]–[9].
In consensus based detection approaches, each node communicates only with its neighbors and
updates its local state information about the phenomenon (summary statistic) by a local fusion
rule that employs a weighted combination of its own value and those received from its neighbors.
Nodes continue with this consensus iteration until the whole network converges to a steady-state
value which is the global test statistic. In particular, the authors in [5], [6] considered average
consensus based distributed detection and emphasized network designs based on the small world
phenomenon for faster convergence [7]. A bio-inspired consensus scheme was introduced for
spectrum sensing in [8]. However, these consensus-based fusion algorithms only ensure equal
gain combining of local measurements. The authors in [9] proposed to use distributed weighted
fusion algorithms for cognitive radio spectrum sensing. They showed that weighted average
consensus based schemes outperform average consensus based schemes and achieve much better
detection performance than the equal gain combining based schemes. However, the weighted
average consensus based detection schemes are quite vulnerable to different types of attacks.
One typical attack on such networks is a Byzantine attack. While Byzantine attacks (originally
proposed in [10]) may, in general, refer to many types of malicious behavior, our focus in this
paper is on data-falsification attacks [11]–[18]. Thus far, research on detection in the presence of
Byzantine attacks has predominantly focused on addressing these attacks under the centralized
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3model [13], [14], [18], [19]. A few attempts have been made to address the security threats in
the distributed or consensus based schemes in recent research [20]–[25]. Most of these existing
works on countering Byzantine or data falsification attacks in distributed networks rely on a
threshold for detecting Byzantines. The main idea is to exclude nodes from neighbors list whose
state information deviates significantly from the mean value. In [22] and [25], two different
defense schemes against data falsification attacks for distributed consensus-based detection were
proposed. In [22], the scheme eliminates the state value with the largest deviation from the local
mean at each iteration step and, therefore, it can only deal with the situation in which only one
Byzantine node exists. It excludes one state value even if there is no Byzantine node. In [25],
the vulnerability of distributed consensus-based spectrum sensing was analyzed and an outlier
detection algorithm with an adaptive threshold was proposed. The authors in [24] proposed a
Byzantine mitigation technique based on adaptive local thresholds. This scheme mitigates the
misbehavior of Byzantine nodes and tolerates the occasional large deviation introduced by honest
users. It adaptively reduces the corresponding coefficients so that the Byzantines will eventually
be isolated from the network.
Excluding the Byzantine nodes from the fusion process may not be the best strategy from the
network designer’s perspective. As shown in our earlier work [18] in the context of distributed
detection with one-bit measurements under a centralized model, an intelligent way to improve
the performance of the network is to use the information of the identified Byzantines to the
network’s benefit. More specifically, learning based techniques have the potential to outperform
the existing exclusion based techniques. In this paper, we pursue such a design philosophy in
the context of raw data based fusion in decentralized networks.
To design methodologies for defending against Byzantine attacks, fundamental challenges
that arise are two-fold. First, how do nodes recognize the presence of attackers? Second, after
identification of an attacker or group of attackers, how do nodes adapt their operating parameters?
Due to the large number of nodes and complexity of the distributed network, we develop and
analyze schemes that would update their own operating parameters autonomously. Our approach
further introduces an adaptive fusion based detection algorithm which supports the learning of
the attacker’s behavior. Our scheme differs from all existing work on Byzantine mitigation based
on exclusion strategies [21]–[25], where the only defense is to identify and exclude the attackers
from the consensus process.
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4A. Main Contributions
In this paper, we focus on the susceptibility and protection of consensus based detection
algorithms. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We characterize the effect of Byzantines on the steady-state performance of the conventional
consensus based detection algorithms. More specifically, we quantify the minimum fraction
of Byzantines needed to make the deflection coefficient of the global statistic equal to zero.
• Using probability of detection and probability of false alarm as measures of detection perfor-
mance, we investigate the degradation of transient detection performance of the conventional
consensus algorithms with Byzantines.
• We propose a robust distributed weighted average consensus algorithm and obtain closed-
form expressions for optimal weights to mitigate the effect of data falsification attacks.
• Finally, we propose a technique based on the expectation-maximization algorithm and
maximum likelihood estimation to learn the operating parameters (or weights) of the nodes
in the network to enable an adaptive design of the local fusion or update rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections II and III, we introduce our system
model and Byzantine attack model, respectively. In Section IV, we study the security performance
of weighted average consensus based detection schemes. In Section V, we propose a protection
mechanism to mitigate the effect of data falsification attacks on consensus based detection
schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
First, we define the network model used in this paper.
A. Network Model
We model the network topology as an undirected graph G = (V,E), where V = {v1, · · · , vN}
represents the set of nodes in the network with |V | = N . The set of communication links in
the network correspond to the set of edges E, where (vi, vj) ∈ E, if and only if there is a
communication link between vi and vj (so that, vi and vj can directly communicate with each
other). The adjacency matrix A of the graph is defined as
aij =

 1 if (vi, vj) ∈ E,0 otherwise.
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Figure 1. A distributed network with 6 nodes
The neighborhood of a node i is defined as
Ni = {vj ∈ V : (vi, vj) ∈ E}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
The degree of a node vi in a graph G, denoted by di, is the number of edges in E which include
vi as an endpoint, i.e., di =
∑N
j=1 aij .
The degree matrix D is defined as a diagonal matrix with diag(d1, · · · , dN) and the Laplacian
matrix L is defined as
lij =

 di if j = i,−aij otherwise.
or, in other words, L = D−A. For example, consider a network with six nodes trying to reach
consensus (see Figure 1). The Laplacian matrix L for this network is given by


1 −1 0 0 0 0
−1 3 −1 −1 0 0
0 −1 2 −1 0 0
0 −1 −1 4 −1 −1
0 0 0 −1 1 0
0 0 0 −1 0 1


.
The consensus based distributed detection scheme usually contains three phases: sensing,
information fusion, and decision making. In the sensing phase, each node acquires the summary
statistic about the phenomenon of interest. In this paper, we adopt the energy detection method
so that the local summary statistic is the received signal energy. Next, in the information fusion
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6phase, each node communicates with its neighbors to update their state values (summary statistic)
and continues with the consensus iteration until the whole network converges to a steady state
which is the global test statistic. Finally, in the decision making phase, nodes make their own
decisions about the presence of the phenomenon. Next, we describe each of these phases in
more detail.
B. Sensing Phase
We consider an N-node network using the energy detection scheme [26]. For the ith node,
the sensed signal xki at time instant k is given by
xki =

 n
k
i , under H0
his
k + nki under H1
where hi is the channel gain, sk is the signal at time instant k, nki is AWGN, i.e., nki ∼ N(0, σ2i )
and independent across time. Each node i calculates a summary statistic Yi over a detection
interval of M samples, i.e.,
Yi =
∑M
k=1 |x
k
i |
2
where M is determined by the time-bandwidth product. Since Yi is the sum of the square of M
i.i.d. Gaussian random variables, it can be shown that Yi
σ2i
follows a central chi-square distribution
with M degrees of freedom (χ2M) under H0, and, a non-central chi-square distribution with M
degrees of freedom and parameter ηi under H1, i.e.,
Yi
σ2i
∼

 χ
2
M , under H0
χ2M(ηi) under H1
where ηi = Es|hi|2/σ2i is the local SNR at the ith node and Es =
∑M
k=1 |s
k|2 represents the
sensed signal energy over M detection instants. Note that the local SNR is M times the average
SNR at the output of the energy detector, which is Es|hi|
2
Mσ2i
.
C. Information Fusion Phase
Next, we give a brief introduction to conventional consensus algorithms [27]. Consensus is
reached in two steps.
April 15, 2015 DRAFT
7Step 1: All nodes establish communication links with their neighbors, and broadcast their
information state xi(0) = Yi.
Step 2: Each node updates its local state information by a local fusion rule (weighted com-
bination of its own value and those received from its neighbors). We denote node i’s updated
information at iteration k by xi(k). Node i continues to broadcast information xi(k) and update
its local information state until consensus is reached. This information state updating process
can be written in a compact form as
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) +
ǫ
wi
∑
j∈Ni
(xj(k)− xi(k)) (1)
where ǫ is the time step and wi is the weight assigned to node i’s information. Using the notation
x(k) = [x1(k), · · · , xN(k)]T , network dynamics in the matrix form can be represented as,
x(k + 1) = Wx(k)
where, W = I − ǫ diag(1/w1, · · · , 1/wN)L is referred to as a Perron matrix. The consensus
algorithm is nothing but a local fusion or update rule that fuses the nodes’ local information
state with information coming from neighbor nodes and every node asymptotically reaches the
same information state for arbitrary initial values.
D. Decision Making Phase
The final information state after reaching consensus for the above consensus algorithm will be
the weighted average of the initial states of all the nodes [27] or x∗i =
∑N
i=1wiYi/
∑N
i=1wi, ∀i.
Average consensus can be seen as a special case of weighted average consensus with wi = w, ∀i.
After the whole network reaches a consensus, each node makes its own decision about the
hypothesis using a predefined threshold λ1
Decision =

 H1 if x
∗
i > λ
H0 otherwise
1In practice, parameters such as threshold λ and consensus time step ǫ can be set off-line. This study is beyond the scope of
this work.
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8where weights are given by [9]
wi =
ηi/σ
2
i∑N
i=1 ηi/σ
2
i
. (2)
Note that, after reaching consensus x∗i = Λ, ∀i. Thus, in rest the of the paper, Λ is referred to
as the final test statistic.
Next, we discuss Byzantine attacks on consensus based detection schemes and analyze the
performance degradation of the weighted average consensus based detection algorithm due to
these attacks.
III. ATTACKS ON CONSENSUS BASED DETECTION ALGORITHMS
When there are no adversaries in the network, we noted in the last section that consensus can
be accomplished to the weighted average of arbitrary initial values by having the nodes use the
update strategy x(k+1) = Wx(k) with an appropriate weight matrix W . Suppose, however, that
instead of broadcasting the true sensing statistic Yi and applying the update strategy (1), some
nodes (referred to as Byzantines) deviate from the prescribed strategies. Accordingly, Byzantines
can attack in two ways: data falsification (nodes falsify their initial data or weight values) and
consensus disruption (nodes do not follow update rule given by (1)). More specifically, Byzantine
node i can do the following
Data falsification: xi(0) = Yi +∆i, or wi → w˜i
Consensus disruption: xi(k + 1) = xi(k) +
ǫ
wi
∑
j∈Ni
(xj(k)− xi(k)) + ui(k),
where (∆i, w˜i) and ui(k) are introduced at the initialization step and at the update step k,
respectively. The attack model considered above is extremely general, and allows Byzantine node
i to update its value in a completely arbitrary manner (via appropriate choices of (∆i, w˜i), and
ui(k), at each time step). An adversary performing consensus disruption attack has the objective
to disrupt the consensus operation. However, consensus disruption attacks can be easily detected
because of the nature of the attack. The identification of consensus disruption attackers has been
investigated in the past literature (e.g., see [7], [28]) where control theoretic techniques were
developed to identify disruption attackers in a single consensus iteration. Knowing the existence
of such an identification mechanism, a smart adversary will aim to disguise itself while degrading
the detection performance. In contrast to disruption attackers, data falsification attackers are more
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9capable and can manage to disguise themselves while degrading the detection performance of
the network by falsifying their data. Susceptibility and protection of consensus strategies to data
falsification attacks has received scant attention, and this is the focus of our work. In this paper,
we assume that an attacker performs only a data falsification attack by introducing (∆i, w˜i) during
initialization. We exploit the statistical distribution of the initial values and devise techniques to
mitigate the influence of Byzantines on the distributed detection system.
A. Data Falsification Attack
In data falsification attacks, attackers try to manipulate the final test statistic (i.e., Λ =
(
∑N
i=1wiYi)/(
∑N
i=1wi)) in a way that the detection performance is degraded. We consider a
network with N nodes that uses Algorithm (1) for reaching consensus. Algorithm (1) can be
interpreted as, weight wi, given to node i’s data Yi in the final test statistic, is assigned by node
i itself. So by falsifying initial values Yi or weights wi, the attackers can manipulate the final
test statistic. Detection performance will be degraded because Byzantine nodes can always set a
higher weight to their manipulated information. Thus, the final statistic’s value across the whole
network will be dominated by the Byzantine node’s local statistic that will lead to degraded
detection performance.
Next, we define a mathematical model for data falsification attackers. We analyze the degra-
dation in detection performance of the network when Byzantines falsify their initial values Yi
for fixed arbitrary weights w˜i.
B. Attack Model
The objective of Byzantines is to degrade the detection performance of the network by
falsifying their data (Yi, wi). By assuming that Byzantines are intelligent and know the true
hypothesis, we analyze the worst case detection performance of the data fusion schemes. We
consider the case when weights of the Byzantines have already been tampered to w˜i and analyze
the effect of falsifying the initial values Yi. This analysis provides the most favorable case
from the point of view of Byzantines and yields the maximum performance degradation that the
Byzantines can cause. Now a mathematical model for a Byzantine attack is presented. Byzantines
tamper with their initial values Yi and send Y˜i such that the detection performance is degraded.
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Under H0:
Y˜i =

 Yi +∆i with probability PiYi with probability (1− Pi)
Under H1:
Y˜i =

 Yi −∆i with probability PiYi with probability (1− Pi)
where Pi is the attack probability and ∆i is a constant value which represents the attack
strength, which is zero for honest nodes. As we show later, Byzantine nodes will use a large value
of ∆i so that the final statistic’s value is dominated by the Byzantine node’s local statistic that will
lead to a degraded detection performance. We use deflection coefficient [29] to characterize the
security performance of the detection scheme due to its simplicity and its strong relationship with
the global detection performance. Deflection coefficient of the global test statistic is defined as:
D(Λ) =
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2(0)
, where µk = E[Λ|Hk] is the conditional mean and σ2(k) = E[(Λ−µk)2|Hk] is
the conditional variance. The deflection coefficient is also closely related to other performance
measures, e.g., the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve. In general, the detection
performance monotonically increases with an increasing value of the deflection coefficient. We
define the critical point of the distributed detection network as the minimum fraction of Byzantine
nodes needed to make the deflection coefficient of global test statistic equal to zero (in which
case, we say that the network becomes blind) and denote it by αblind. We assume that the
communication between nodes is error-free and our network topology is fixed during the whole
consensus process and, therefore, consensus can be reached without disruption.
In the next section, we analyze the security performance of consensus based detection schemes
in the presence of data falsifying Byzantines.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF CONSENSUS BASED DETECTION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we analyze the effect of data falsification attacks on conventional consensus
based detection algorithms.
First, in Section IV-A, we characterize the effect of Byzantines on the steady-state performance
of the consensus based detection algorithms and determine αblind. Next, in Section IV-B, using
probability of detection and probability of false alarm as measures of detection performance, we
April 15, 2015 DRAFT
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µ0 =
N1∑
i=1
[
Pi
w˜i
sum(w)
(Mσ2i +∆i) + (1− Pi)
w˜i
sum(w)
(Mσ2i )
]
+
N∑
i=N1+1
[
wi
sum(w)
(Mσ2i )
]
(3)
µ1 =
N1∑
i=1
[
Pi
w˜i
sum(w)
((M + ηi)σ
2
i −∆i) + (1− Pi)
w˜i
sum(w)
((M + ηi)σ
2
i )
]
+
N∑
i=N1+1
[
wi
sum(w)
((M + ηi)σ
2
i )
]
(4)
σ2(0) =
N1∑
i=1
(
w˜i
sum(w)
)2 [
Pi(1− Pi)∆
2
i + 2Mσ
4
i
]
+
N∑
i=N1+1
(
wi
sum(w)
)2 [
2Mσ4i
] (5)
investigate the degradation of transient detection performance of the consensus algorithms with
Byzantines.
A. Steady-State Performance Analysis with Byzantines
Without loss of generality, we assume that the nodes corresponding to the first N1 indices
i = 1, · · · , N1 are Byzantines and the rest corresponding to indices i = N1+1, · · · , N are honest
nodes. Let us define w = [w˜1, · · · , w˜N1, wN1+1 · · · , wN ]T and sum(w) =
∑N1
i=1 w˜i+
∑N
i=N1+1
wi.
Lemma 1. For data fusion schemes, the condition to blind the network or to make the deflection
coefficient zero is given by
N1∑
i=1
w˜i(2Pi∆i − ηiσ
2
i ) =
N∑
i=N1+1
wiηiσ
2
i .
Proof: The local test statistic Yi has the mean
meani =

 Mσ
2
i if H0
(M + ηi)σ
2
i if H1
and the variance
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Figure 2. Deflection Coefficient as a function of attack parameters P and D.
V ari =

 2Mσ
4
i if H0
2(M + 2ηi)σ
4
i if H1.
The goal of Byzantine nodes is to make the deflection coefficient as small as possible.
Since the Deflection Coefficient is always non-negative; the Byzantines seek to make D(Λ) =
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2(0)
= 0. The conditional mean µk = E[Λ|Hk] and conditional variance σ2(0) = E[(Λ −
µ0)
2|H0] of the global test statistic, Λ = (
∑N1
i=1 w˜iY˜i +
∑N
i=N1+1
wiYi)/(sum(w)), can be com-
puted and are given by (3), (4) and (5), respectively. After substituting values from (3), (4) and
(5), the condition to make D(Λ) = 0 becomes
N1∑
i=1
w˜i(2Pi∆i − ηiσ
2
i ) =
N∑
i=N1+1
wiηiσ
2
i
Note that, when wi = w˜i = z, ηi = η, σi = σ, Pi = P,∆i = D, ∀i, the blinding condition
simplifies to N1
N
=
1
2
ησ2
PD
. This condition indicates that by appropriately choosing attack
parameters (P,D), an adversary needs less than 50% of sensing data falsifying Byzantines
to make the deflection coefficient zero.
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 2. We
plot the deflection coefficient of global test statistic as a function of attack parameters Pi =
P,∆i = D, ∀i. We consider a 6-node network with the topology given by the undirected graph
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shown in Figure 1 to detect a phenomenon. Nodes 1 and 2 are considered to be Byzantines.
Channel gains of the nodes are assumed to be h = [0.8, 0.7, 0.72, 0.61, 0.69, 0.9] and weights
are given by (2). We also assume that M = 12, Es = 5 and σ2i = 1. Notice that, the deflection
coefficient is zero when the condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied. Another observation to make
is that the deflection coefficient can be made zero even when only two out of six nodes are
Byzantines. Thus, by appropriately choosing attack parameters (P,D), less than 50% of data
falsifying Byzantines are needed to blind the network.
B. Transient Performance Analysis with Byzantines
Next, we analyze the detection performance of the data fusion schemes, denoted as x(t+1) =
W tx(0), as a function of consensus iteration t in the presence of Byzantines. For analytical
tractability, we assume that Pi = P, ∀i. We denote by wtji the element of matrix W t in the jth
row and ith column. Using these notations, we calculate the probability of detection and the
probability of false alarm at the jth node at consensus iteration t.
For sufficiently large M , the distribution of Byzantine’s data Y˜i given Hk is a Gaussian mixture
which comes from N ((µ1k)i, (σ1k)2i ) with probability (1− P ) and from N ((µ2k)i, (σ2k)2i ) with
probability P , where N denotes the normal distribution and
(µ10)i = Mσ
2
i , (µ20)i = Mσ
2
i +∆i
(µ11)i = (M + ηi)σ
2
i , (µ21)i = (M + ηi)σ
2
i −∆i
(σ10)
2
i = (σ20)
2
i = 2Mσ
4
i , and (σ11)2i = (σ21)2i = 2(M + ηi)σ4i .
Now, the probability density function (PDF) of xtji = wtjiY˜i conditioned on Hk can be derived
as
f(xtji|Hk) = (1− P )φ(w
t
ji(µ1k)i, (w
t
ji(σ1k)i)
2)
+ Pφ(wtji(µ2k)i, (w
t
ji(σ2k)i)
2) (6)
where φ(x|µ, σ2) (for notational convenience denoted as φ(µ, σ2)) is the PDF of X ∼ N (µ, σ2)
and φ(x|µ, σ2) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2
. Next, for clarity of exposition, we first derive our results
for a small network with two Byzantine nodes and one honest node. Later we generalize our
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results for an arbitrary number of nodes, N .
Notice that, for the three node case, the transient test statistic Λ˜tj = wtj1Y˜1+wtj2Y˜2+wtj3Y3, is a
summation of independent random variables. The conditional PDF of X tji = wtjiY˜i is given in (6).
Notice that, PDF of Λ˜tj is the convolution (∗) of f(xtj1) = (1−P )φ(µ11, (σ11)2) +Pφ(µ21, (σ21)2),
f(xtj2) = (1− P )φ(µ
1
2, (σ
1
2)
2) + Pφ(µ22, (σ
2
2)
2)) and f(xtj3) = φ(µ13, (σ13)2).
f(ztj) = f(x
t
j1) ∗ f(x
t
j2) ∗ f(x
t
j3)
f(ztj) = [(1− P )φ(µ
1
1, (σ
1
1)
2) + Pφ(µ21, (σ
2
1)
2)]∗
[(1− P )φ(µ12, (σ
1
2)
2) + Pφ(µ22, (σ
2
2)
2)] ∗ φ(µ13, (σ
1
3)
2)
= (1− P )2[φ(µ11, (σ
1
1)
2) ∗ φ(µ12, (σ
1
2)
2) ∗ φ(µ13, (σ
1
3)
2)]
+(P )2[φ(µ21, (σ
2
1)
2) ∗ φ(µ22, (σ
2
2)
2)) ∗ φ(µ13, (σ
1
3)
2)]
+P (1− P )[φ(µ21, (σ
2
1)
2) ∗ φ(µ12, (σ
1
2)
2) ∗ φ(µ13, (σ
1
3)
2)]
+(1− P )P [φ(µ11, (σ
1
1)
2) ∗ φ(µ22, (σ
2
2)
2) ∗ φ(µ13, (σ
1
3)
2)]
Now, using the fact that convolution of two normal PDFs φ(µi, σ2i ) and φ(µj, σ2j ) is again
normally distributed with mean (µi + µj) and variance (σ2i + σ2j ), we can derive the results
below.
f(ztj) = (1− P )
2[φ(µ11 + µ
1
2 + µ
1
3, (σ
1
1)
2 + (σ12)
2 + (σ13)
2)]
+P 2[φ(µ21 + µ
2
2 + µ
1
3, (σ
2
1)
2 + (σ22)
2 + (σ13)
2)]
+P (1− P )[φ(µ21 + µ
1
2 + µ
1
3, (σ
2
1)
2 + (σ12)
2 + (σ13)
2)]
+(1− P )P [φ(µ11 + µ
2
2 + µ
1
3, (σ
1
1)
2 + (σ22)
2 + (σ13)
2)].
Due to the probabilistic nature of the Byzantine’s behavior, it may behave as an honest node
with a probability (1−Pi). Let S denote the set of all combinations of such Byzantine strategies:
S = {{b1, b2}, {h1, b2}, {b1, h2}, {h1, h2}} (7)
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where by bi we mean that Byzantine node i behaves as a Byzantine and by hi we mean that
Byzantine node i behaves as an honest node. Let As ∈ U denote the indices of honest nodes in
the strategy combination s, then, from (7) we have
U = {A1 = {}, A2 = {1}, A3 = {2}, A4 = {1, 2}}
U c = {Ac1 = {1, 2}, A
c
2 = {2}, A
c
3 = {1}, A
c
4 = {}}
where {} is used to denote the null set and ms to denote the cardinality of subset As ∈ U . Using
these notations, we generalize our results for any arbitrary N .
Lemma 2. The test statistic of node j at consensus iteration t, i.e., Λ˜tj =
∑N1
i=1w
t
jiY˜i +∑N
i=N1+1
wtjiYi is a Gaussian mixture with PDF
f(Λ˜tj|Hk) =
∑
As∈U
PN1−ms(1− P )msφ
(
(µk)As +
N∑
i=N1+1
wtji(µ1k)i,
N∑
i=1
(wtji(σ1k)i)
2)
)
with (µk)As =
∑
u∈As
wtju(µ1k)j +
∑
u∈Acs
wtju(µ2k)j .
The performance of the detection scheme in the presence of Byzantines can be represented
in terms of the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm of the network.
Proposition 1. The probability of detection and the probability of false alarm of node j at
consensus iteration t in the presence of Byzantines can be represented as
P
t
d(j) =
∑
As∈U
P
N1−ms(1− P )msQ

λ− (µ1)As −
∑N
i=N1+1
wtji(µ11)i√∑N
i=1(w
t
ji(σ11)i)
2)

 ,
P
t
f (j) =
∑
As∈U
P
N1−ms (1− P )msQ

λ− (µ0)As −
∑N
i=N1+1
wtji(µ10)i√∑N
i=1(w
t
ji(σ10)i)
2)

 .
Remark 1. Notice that, the expressions of probability of detection P td(j) and probability of false
alarm P tf(j) for the N1 Byzantine node case involves 2N1 combinations (cardinality of U is 2N1).
It, however, can be represented compactly by vectorizing the expressions, i.e.,
P td(j) = 1
T

b⊗Q

 λ1-µ1√∑N
i=1(wi(σ10)i)
2)




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with µ1 = [Awtjµ11+Acwtjµ21−
N∑
i=N1+1
wtji(µ11)i], B = (1−P )A+PA
c and b = [B1⊗· · ·⊗
B
N1 ], where boldface letters represent vectors, ⊗ symbol represents element-wise multiplication,
Q(·) represents element wise Q function operation, i.e., Q(x1, · · · , xN1) = [Q(x1), · · · , Q(xN1)]T ,
B
i is ith column of matrix B, wt
j
µu1 = [w
t
j1µ
1
u1, · · · , w
t
jN1
µN1u1 ]
T
, matrix A(2N1∗N1) is the binary
representation of decimal numbers from 0 to N1 − 1 and Ac is the matrix after interchanging 1
and 0 in matrix A.
Similarly, the expression for the probability of false alarm P tf (j) can be vectorized into a
compact form.
Next, to gain insights into the results given in Proposition 1, we present some numerical
results in Figures 3 and 4. We consider the 6-node network shown in Figure 1 where the nodes
employ the consensus algorithm 1 with ǫ = 0.6897 to detect a phenomenon. Nodes 1 and 2
are considered to be Byzantines. We also assume that ηi = 10, σ2i = 2, λ = 33 and wi = 1.
Attack parameters are assumed to be (Pi,∆i) = (0.5, 6) and w˜i = 1.1. To characterize the
transient performance of the weighted average consensus algorithm, in Figure 3(a), we plot the
probability of detection as a function of the number of consensus iterations when Byzantines are
not falsifying their data, i.e., (∆i = 0, w˜i = wi). Next, in Figure 3(b), we plot the probability of
detection as a function of the number of consensus iterations in the presence of Byzantines. It can
be seen that the detection performance degrades in the presence of Byzantines. In Figure 4(a),
we plot the probability of false alarm as a function of the number of consensus iterations when
Byzantines are not falsifying their data, i.e., (∆i = 0, w˜i = wi). Next, in Figure 4(b), we plot
the probability of false alarm as a function of the number of consensus iterations in the presence
of Byzantines. From both Figures 3 and 4, it can be seen that the Byzantine attack can severely
degrade transient detection performance.
From the discussion in this section, we can see that Byzantines can severely degrade both the
steady-state and the transient detection performance of conventional consensus based detection
algorithms. As mentioned earlier, a data falsifying Byzantine i can tamper its weight wi as well
as its sensing data Yi to degrade detection performance. One approach to mitigate the effect of
sensing data falsification is to assign weights based on the quality of the data. In other words,
lower weight is assigned to the data of the node identified as a Byzantine. However, to implement
this approach one has to address the following two issues.
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Figure 3. (a) Probability of detection as a function of consensus iteration steps. (b) Probability of detection as a function of
consensus iteration steps with Byzantines.
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Iteration Steps
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y o
f F
als
e 
Al
ar
m
 
 
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
(a)
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Iteration Steps
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y o
f F
als
e 
Al
ar
m
 
 
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
(b)
Figure 4. (a) Probability of false alarm as a function of consensus iteration steps. (b) Probability of false alarm as a function
of consensus iteration steps with Byzantines.
First, in the conventional weighted average consensus algorithm, weight wi given to node i’s
data is assigned by the node itself. Thus, a Byzantine node can always set a higher weight to its
manipulated information and the final statistics will be dominated by the Byzantine nodes’ local
statistic that will lead to degraded detection performance. It will be impossible for any algorithm
to detect this type of malicious behavior, since any weight that a Byzantine chooses for itself
is a legitimate value that could also have been chosen by a node that is functioning correctly.
Thus, the conventional consensus algorithm cannot be used in the presence of an attacker.
Second, as will be seen later, the optimal weights assigned to nodes’ sensing data depend
on the following unknown parameters: identity of the nodes (i.e., honest or Byzantine) and
underlying statistical distribution of the nodes’ data.
In the next section, we address these concerns by proposing a learning based robust weighted
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average consensus algorithm.
V. A ROBUST CONSENSUS BASED DETECTION ALGORITHM
In order to address the first issue, we propose a consensus algorithm in which the weight for
node i’s information is assigned (or updated) by neighbors of the node i rather than by node i
itself. Note that, networks deploying such an algorithm is more robust to weight manipulation
because if a Byzantine node j wants to lower the weight assigned to the data of its honest
neighbor i in the global test statistic, it has to make sure that a majority of the neighbors of i
put the same lower weight as j. In other words, every honest node should have majority of its
neighbors that are Byzantines, otherwise, it can be treated as a consensus disruption attack and
Byzantines can be easily identified detected by techniques such as those given in [7], [28].
A. Distributed Algorithm for Weighted Average Consensus
In this section, we address the following questions: does there exist a distributed algorithm
that solves the weighted average consensus problem while satisfying the condition that weights
must be assigned or updated by neighbors Ni of the node i rather than by the node i itself? If
it exists, then, under what conditions or constraints does the algorithm converge?
We consider a network with N nodes with a fixed and connected topology G(V,E). Next,
we state Perron-Frobenius theorem [30], which will be used later for the design and analysis of
our robust weighted average consensus algorithm.
Theorem 1 ( [30]). Let W be a primitive nonnegative matrix with left and right eigenvectors u
and v, respectively, satisfying Wv = v and uTW = uT . Then, limk→∞W k = vuTvT u .
Using the above theorem, we take a reverse-engineering approach to design a modified Perron
matrix Wˆ which has the weight vector w = [w1, w2, · · · , wN ]T , wi > 0, ∀i as its left eigenvector
and ~1 as its right eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue 1. From the above theorem, if the
modified Perron matrix Wˆ is primitive and nonnegative, then, a weighted average consensus can
be achieved. Now, the problem boils down to designing such a Wˆ which meets our requirement
that weights are assigned or updated by the neighbors Ni of node i rather than by node i itself.
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Next, we propose a modified Perron matrix Wˆ = I − ǫ(T ⊗L) where L is the original graph
Laplacian, ⊗ is element-wise matrix multiplication operator, and T is a transformation given by
[T ]ij =


∑
j∈Ni
wj
lii
if i = j
wj otherwise.
Observe that, the above transformation T satisfies the condition that weights are assigned or
updated by neighbors Ni of node i rather than by node i itself. Based on the above transformation
T , we propose our distributed consensus algorithm:
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + ǫ
∑
j∈Ni
wj(xj(k)− xi(k)).
Let us denote the modified Perron matrix by Wˆ = I − ǫLˆ.
Next, we explore the properties of the modified Perron matrix Wˆ and show that it satisfies
the requirements of the Perron-Frobenius theorem [30]. These properties will later be utilized
to prove the convergence of our proposed consensus algorithm.
Lemma 3. Let G be a connected graph with N nodes. Then, the modified Perron matrix Wˆ =
I − ǫ(T ⊗ L), with 0 < ǫ < 1
max
i
(
∑
j∈Ni
wj)
satisfies the following properties.
1) Wˆ is a nonnegative matrix with left eigenvector w and right eigenvector ~1 corresponding
to eigenvalue 1;
2) All eigenvalues of Wˆ are in a unit circle;
3) Wˆ is a primitive matrix2.
Proof: Notice that, Wˆ~1 = ~1 − ǫ(T ⊗ L)~1 = ~1 and wTWˆ = wT − ǫwT (T ⊗ L) = wT . This
implies that Wˆ has left eigenvector w and right eigenvector ~1 corresponding to eigenvalue 1. To
show that Wˆ = I + ǫT ⊗A− ǫT ⊗D is non-negative, it is sufficient to show that: w > 0, ǫ > 0
and ǫ(maxi(
∑
j∈Ni
wj)) ≤ 1, ∀i. Since w is the left eigenvector of Lˆ and w > 0, Wˆ is non-negative
if and only if
0 < ǫ ≤ 1
maxi(
∑
j∈Ni
wj)
.
2A matrix is primitive if it is non-negative and its mth power is positive for some natural number m.
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To prove part 2), notice that all the eigenvectors of Wˆ and Lˆ are the same. Let γj be the jth
eigenvalue of Lˆ, then, the jth eigenvalue of Wˆ is λj = 1− ǫγj . Now, part 2) can be proved by
applying Gershgorin theorem [30] to the modified Laplacian matrix Lˆ.
To prove part 3), note that G is strongly connected and, therefore, Wˆ is an irreducible
matrix [30]. Thus, to prove that Wˆ is a primitive matrix, it is sufficient3 to show that Wˆ
has a single eigenvalue with maximum modulus of 1. In [27], the authors showed that when
0 < ǫ < max
i
(
∑
j 6=i
aij), the original Perron matrix W has only one eigenvalue with maximum
modulus 1 at its spectral radius. Using a similar logic, Wˆ is a primitive matrix if
0 < ǫ < 1
max
i
(
∑
j∈Ni
wj)
.
Theorem 2. Consider a network with fixed and strongly connected undirected topology G(V,E)
that employs the distributed consensus algorithm
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + ǫ
∑
j∈Ni
wj(xj(k)− xi(k))
where
0 < ǫ < 1
max
i
(
∑
j∈Ni
wj)
.
Then, consensus with x∗i =
∑N
i=1 wixi(0)∑n
i=1 wi
, ∀i is reached asymptotically.
Proof: A consensus is reached asymptotically, if the limit lim
k→∞
Wˆ k exists. According to
Perron-Frobenius theorem [30], this limit exists for primitive matrices. Note that, ~1 = [1, · · · , 1]T
and w are right and left eigenvectors of the primitive nonnegative matrix Wˆ respectively. Thus,
3An irreducible stochastic matrix is primitive if it has only one eigenvalue with maximum modulus.
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Figure 5. Convergence of the network with a 6-nodes (ǫ = 0.3).
from [30]
lim
k→∞
x(k) = lim
k→∞
(Wˆ )kx(0)
x∗ = ~1
wTx(0)
wT~1
x∗ = ~1
∑N
i=1wixi(0)∑n
i=1wi
Next, to gain insights into the convergence property of the proposed algorithm, we present
some numerical results in Figure 5. We consider the 6-node network shown in Figure 1 where
the nodes employ the proposed algorithm (with ǫ = 0.3) to reach a consensus. Next, we plot the
updated state values at each node as a function of consensus iterations. We assume that the initial
data vector is x(0) = [5, 2, 7, 9, 8, 1]T and the weight vector is w = [0.65, 0.55, 0.48, 0.95, 0.93, 0.90]T .
Note that, the parameter ǫ satisfies the condition mentioned in Theorem 2. Figure 5 shows the
convergence of the proposed algorithm iterations for a fixed communication graph. It is observed
that within 20 iterations consensus has been reached on the global decision statistics or weighted
average of the initial values (states).
In the proposed consensus algorithm, weights assigned to node i’s data are updated by
neighbors of the node i rather than by node i itself which addresses the first issue.
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B. Adaptive Design of the Update Rules based on Learning of Nodes’ Behavior
Next, to address the second issue, we exploit the statistical distribution of the sensing data and
devise techniques to mitigate the influence of Byzantines on the distributed detection system.
We propose a three-tier mitigation scheme where the following three steps are performed at each
node: 1) identification of Byzantine neighbors, 2) estimation of parameters of identified Byzan-
tine neighbors, and 3) adaptation of consensus algorithm (or update weights) using estimated
parameters.
We first present the design of distributed optimal weights for the honest/Byzantine nodes
assuming that the identities of the nodes are known. Later we will explain how the identity of
nodes (i.e., honest/Byzantine) can be determined.
1) Design of Distributed Optimal Weights in the Presence of Byzantines: In this subsection,
we derive closed form expressions for the distributed optimal weights which maximize the
deflection coefficient. First, we consider the global test statistic Λ =
∑N1
i=1 w
B
i Y˜i+
∑N
i=N1+1
wHi Yi
∑N1
i=1 w
B
i +
∑N
i=N1+1
wHi
and obtain a closed form solution for optimal centralized weights. Then, we extend our anal-
ysis to the distributed scenario. Let us denote by δBi , the centralized weight given to the
Byzantine node and by δHi , the centralized weight given to the Honest node. By considering
δBi = w
B
i /
(
N1∑
i=1
wBi +
N∑
i=N1+1
wHi
)
and δHi = wHi /
(
N1∑
i=1
wBi +
N∑
i=N1+1
wHi
)
, the optimal weight
design problem can be stated formally as:
max
{δBi }
N1
i=1,{δHi }Ni=N1+1
(µ1 − µ0)
2
σ2(0)
st.
N1∑
i=1
δBi +
N∑
i=N1+1
δHi = 1
where µ1, µ0 and σ2(0) are given as in (3), (4) and (5), respectively. The solution of the above
problem is presented in the next lemma.
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Lemma 4. Optimal centralized weights which maximize the deflection coefficient are given as
δBi =
wBi
N1∑
i=1
wBi +
N∑
i=N1+1
wHi
,
δHi =
wHi
N1∑
i=1
wBi +
N∑
i=N1+1
wHi
where wBi =
(ηiσ
2
i − 2Pi∆i)
∆2iPi(1− Pi) + 2Mσ
4
i
and wHi =
ηi
2Mσ2i
.
Proof: The above results can be obtained by equating the derivative of the deflection
coefficient to zero.
Remark 2. Distributed optimal weights can be chosen as wBi and wHi . Thus, the value of the
global test statistic (or final weighted average consensus) is the same as the optimal centralized
weighted combining4.
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 6 that
corroborate our theoretical results. We assume that M = 12, ηi = 3, σ2i = 0.5 and the attack
4Note that, weights wBi can be negative and in that case convergence of the proposed algorithm is not guaranteed. However,
this situation can be dealt off-line by adding a constant value to make wBi ≥ 0 and changing the threshold λ accordingly. More
specifically, by choosing a constant c such that
(
wBi +
c
xi(0)
)
≥ 0, ∀i and λ ← λ + βc where β is number of nodes with
wBi < 0.
April 15, 2015 DRAFT
24
parameters are (Pi,∆i) = (0.5, 9). In Figure 6, we compare our proposed weighted average
consensus based detection scheme with the equal gain combining scheme5 and the scheme
where Byzantines are cut off or removed from the fusion process.
It can be clearly seen from the figure that our proposed scheme performs better than the rest
of the schemes.
Notice that, the optimal weights for the Byzantines are functions of the attack parameters
(Pi, ∆i), which may not be known to the neighboring nodes in practice. In addition, the
parameters of the honest nodes might also not be known. Thus, we propose a technique to
learn or estimate these parameters. We then use these estimates to adaptively design the local
fusion rule which are updated after each learning iteration.
2) Identification, Estimation, and Adaptive Fusion Rule: The first step at each node m is to
determine the identity (I i ∈ {H,B}) of its neighboring nodes i ∈ Nm. Notice that, if node i is
an honest node, its data under hypothesis Hk is normally distributed N ((µ1k)i, (σ1k)2i ). On the
other hand, if node i is a Byzantine node, its data under hypothesis Hk is a Gaussian mixture
which comes from N ((µ1k)i, (σ1k)2i ) with probability (αi1 = 1−Pi) and from N ((µ2k)i, (σ2k)2i )
with probability αi2 = Pi. Therefore, determining the identity (I i ∈ {H,B}) of neighboring
nodes i ∈ Nm can be posed as a hypothesis testing problem:
I0 (I
i = H) : Yi is generated from a Gaussian distribution under each hypothesis Hk;
I1 (I
i = B) : Yi is generated from a Gaussian mixture distribution under each hypothesis Hk.
Node classification can then be achieved using the maximum likelihood decision rule:
f(Yi| I0)
H
≷
B
f(Yi| I1) (8)
where f(·| Il) is the probability density function (PDF) under each hypothesis Il. However,
the parameters of the distribution are not known. Next, we propose a technique to learn these
parameters. For an honest node i, the parameters to be estimated are ((µ1k)i, (σ1k)2i ) and for
Byzantines the unknown parameter set to be estimated is θ = {αij , (µjk)i, (σjk)2i }, where k =
{0, 1}, j = {1, 2} and i = 1, · · · , Nm, for Nm neighbor nodes. These parameters are estimated
by observing the data over multiple learning iterations. In each iteration t, every node in the
5In equal gain combining scheme, all the nodes (including Byzantines) are assigned the same weight.
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(σˆ10)
2
i (t+ 1) =
(
t∑
r=1
D1(r))[(σˆ10)
2
i
(t) + ((µˆ10)i(t+ 1)− (µˆ10)i(t))2] +
D1(t+1)∑
d=1
[y0
i
(d)− (µˆ10)i(t+ 1)]2
t+1∑
r=1
D1(r)
(9)
(σˆ11)
2
i (t+ 1) =
t∑
r=1
(D −D1(r))[(σˆ11)2i (t) + ((µˆ11)i(t+ 1)− (µˆ11)i(t))
2] +
D−D1(t+1)∑
d=1
[y1
i
(d)− (µˆ11)i(t+ 1)]2
t+1∑
r=1
(D −D1(r))
(10)
network observes the data coming from their neighbors for D detection intervals to learn their
respective parameters. It is assumed that each node has the knowledge of the true hypothesis
for D detection intervals (or history) through a feedback mechanism.
First, we explain how the unknown parameter set for the distribution under the null hypothesis
(I0) can be estimated. Let us denote the data coming from an honest neighbor node i as Yi(t) =
[y0i (1), · · · , y
0
i (D1(t)), y
1
i (D1(t) + 1), · · · , y
1
i (D)] where D1(t) denotes the number of times H0
occurred in learning iteration t and yki denotes the data of node i when the true hypothesis
was Hk. To estimate the parameter set, ((µ1k)i, (σ1k)2i ), of an honest neighboring node, one can
employ a maximum likelihood based estimator (MLE). We use ((µˆ1k)i(t), (σˆ1k)2i (t)) to denote the
estimates at learning iteration t, where each learning iteration consists of D detection intervals.
The ML estimate of ((µ1k)i, (σ1k)2i ) can be written in a recursive form as following:
(µˆ10)i(t+ 1) =
t∑
r=1
D1(r)
t+1∑
r=1
D1(r)
(µˆ10)i(t) +
1
t+1∑
r=1
D1(r)
D1(t+1)∑
d=1
y0i (d) (11)
(µˆ11)i(t+ 1) =
t∑
r=1
(D −D1(r))
t+1∑
r=1
(D −D1(r))
(µˆ11)i(t) +
1
t+1∑
r=1
(D −D1(r))
D∑
d=D1(t+1)
y1i (d) (12)
where expressions for (σˆ10)2i and (σˆ11)2i are given in (9) and (10). Observe that, by writing
these expressions in a recursive manner, we need to store only D data samples at any given
learning iteration t, but effectively use all tD data samples to determine the estimates.
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Next, we explain how the unknown parameter set for the distribution under the alternate hy-
pothesis (I1) can be estimated. Since the data is distributed as a Gaussian mixture, we employ the
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate the unknown parameter set for Byzantines.
Let us denote the data coming from a Byzantine neighbor i as Y˜i(t) = [y˜0i (1), · · · , y˜0i (D1(t)), y˜1i (D1(t)+
1), · · · , y˜1i (D)] where D1(t) denotes the number of times H0 occurred in learning iteration t and
y˜ki denotes the data of node i when the true hypothesis was Hk. Let us denote the hidden variable
as zj with j = {1, 2} or (Z = [z1, z2]). Now, the joint conditional PDF of y˜ki and zj , given the
parameter set, can be calculated to be
P (y˜ki (d), zj|θ) = P (zj|y˜
k
i (d), θ)P (y˜
k
i (d)|(µjk)i, (σjk)
2
i )
= αijP (y˜
k
i (d)|(µjk)i, (σjk)
2
i )
In the expectation step of EM, we compute the expectation of the log-likelihood function with
respect to the hidden variables zj , given the measurements Y˜i, and the current estimate of the
parameter set θl. This is given by
Q(θ, θl) = E[logP (Y˜i, Z|θ)|Y˜i, θ
l]
=
2∑
j=1
D1(t)∑
d=1
log[αijP (y˜
0
i (d)|(µj0)i, (σj0)
2
i )P (zj|y˜
0
i (d), θ
l)]
+
2∑
j=1
D∑
d=D1(t)+1
log[αijP (y˜
1
i (d)|(µj1)i, (σj1)
2
i )P (zj|y˜
1
i (d), θ
l)]
where
P (zj|y˜
k
i (d), θ
l) =
αij(l)P (y˜
k
i (d)|(µjk)i(l), (σjk)
2
i (l))
2∑
n=1
αin(l)P (y˜
k
i (d)|(µnk)i(l), (σnk)
2
i (l))
. (13)
In the maximization step of EM algorithm, we maximize Q(θ, θl) with respect to the parameter
set θ so as to compute the next parameter set:
θl+1 = argmax
θ
Q(θ, θl).
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First, we maximize Q(θ, θl) subject to the constraint
(
2∑
j=1
αij = 1
)
. We define the Lagrangian
L as
L = Q(θ, θl) + λ{
2∑
j=1
αij − 1}.
Now, we equate the derivative of L to zero:
d
dαij
L = λ+
D1(t)∑
d=1
P (zj|y˜0i (d), θ
l)
αij
+
D∑
d=D1(t)+1
P (zj|y˜1i (d), θ
l)
αij
= 0.
Multiplying both sides by αij and summing over j gives λ = −D. Similarly, we equate the
derivative of Q(θ, θl) with respect to (µjk)i and (σk)2i to zero. Now, an iterative algorithm for
all the parameters is
αij(l + 1) =
1
D

D1(t)∑
d=1
P (zj|y˜
0
i (d), θ
l) +
D∑
d=D1(t)+1
P (zj|y˜
1
i (d), θ
l)

 (14)
(µj0)i(l + 1) =
D1(t)∑
d=1
P (zj|y˜
0
i (d), θ
l)y˜0i (d)
D1(t)∑
d=1
P (zj|y˜0i (d), θ
l)
(15)
(µj1)i(l + 1) =
D∑
d=D1(t)+1
P (zj|y˜1i (d), θ
l)y˜1i (d)
D∑
d=D1(t)+1
P (zj|y˜1i (d), θ
l)
(16)
(σj0)
2
i (l + 1) =
2∑
j=1
D1(t)∑
d=1
P (zj|y˜0i (d), θ
l)(y˜0i (d)− (µj0)i(l + 1))
2
2∑
j=1
D1(t)∑
d=1
P (zj|y˜0i (d), θ
l)
(17)
(σj1)
2
i (l + 1) =
2∑
j=1
D∑
d=D1(t)+1
P (zj|y˜1i (d), θ
l)(y˜1i (d)− (µj1)i(l + 1))
2
2∑
j=1
D∑
d=D1(t)+1
P (zj|y˜1i (d), θ
l)
(18)
In the learning iteration t, let the estimates after the convergence of the above algorithm be
denoted by θˆ(t) = {αˆij(t), (µˆjk)i(t), (σˆjk)2i (t)}. These estimates are then used as the initial values
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Figure 7. ROC for different learning iterations
for the next learning iteration t+ 1 that uses a new set of D data samples.
After learning the unknown parameter set under I0 and I1, node classification can be achieved
using the following maximum likelihood decision rule:
fˆ(Yi| I0)
H
≷
B
fˆ(Yi| I1) (19)
where fˆ(·) is the PDF based on estimated parameters.
Using the above estimates and node classification, the optimal distributed weights for honest
nodes after learning iteration t can be written as
wHi (t) =
(µˆ11)i(t)− (µˆ10)i(t)
(σˆ10)2i (t)
. (20)
Similarly, the optimal distributed weights for Byzantines after learning iteration t can be
written as
wBi (t) =
2∑
j=1
αˆij(t)[(µj1)i(t)− (µˆj0)i(t)]
αˆi1(t)αˆ
i
2(t) ((µˆ10(t))i − (µˆ20(t))i)
2 +
(
αˆi1(t) (σˆ10)
2
i (t) + αˆ
i
2(t) (σˆ20)
2
i (t)
) (21)
Next, we present some numerical results in Figure 7 to evaluate the performance of our
proposed scheme. Consider the scenario where 6 nodes organized in an undirected graph (as
shown in Figure 1) are trying to detect a phenomenon. Node 1 and node 2 are considered
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to be Byzantines. We assume that ((µ10)i, (σ10)2i ) = (3, 1.5), ((µ11)i, (σ11)2i ) = (4, 2) and the
attack parameters are (Pi,∆i) = (0.5, 9). In Figure 7, we plot ROC curves for different learning
iterations. For every learning iteration, we assume that D1 = 10 and D = 20. It can be seen from
Figure 7 that within 4 learning iterations, detection performance of the learning based weighted
gain combining scheme approaches the detection performance of weighted gain combining with
known optimal weight based scheme.
Note that, the above learning based scheme can be used in conjunction with the proposed
weighted average consensus based algorithm to mitigate the effect of Byzantines.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we analyzed the security performance of conventional consensus based algo-
rithms in the presence of data falsification attacks. We showed that above a certain fraction of
Byzantine attackers in the network, existing consensus based detection algorithm are ineffective.
Next, we proposed a robust distributed weighted average consensus algorithm and devised a
learning technique to estimate the operating parameters (or weights) of the nodes. This enables
an adaptive design of the local fusion or update rules to mitigate the effect of data falsification
attacks. There are still many interesting questions that remain to be explored in the future
work such as an analysis of the problem for time varying topologies. Note that, some analytical
methodologies used in this paper are certainly exploitable for studying the attacks in time varying
topologies. Other questions such as the optimal topology which incurs the fastest convergence
rate can also be investigated.
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